THE NEW EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION--SHOULD AMERICANS CARE? (UPDATED)

The number one topic of political conversation in Europe for weeks has been the possibility that the French electorate may reject the new European Constitution, in a referendum on it to be held at the end of May. The reason: a month ago, the first poll showing the "No" winning in France appeared. This was a shock in every European capital, since France has been considered the most pro-European country on the Continent, its succesive governments having long played a seminal role in building common European political and economic institutions, since the 1950s.

A French "No" vote would effectively kill the new Constitution. And, since the first French public opinion poll showing a win for the "No," 14 consecutive polls have showed the French rejecting the new Constitution for Europe -- the latest, published Thursday by one of the better-known French polling institutes, CSA, gave the "No" a solid 55%, against just 45% for the "Yes." And the "No" vote appears to have doubled its margin of victory in just two short weeks -- despite an extraordinary mobilization of the French and European political and media establishments in support of a "Yes" vote.

Why, you may ask, should Americans care?

I have long been in favor of a strong, federal Europe -- and not simply because I developed great affinities for Europe during the decade I spent living in France. As the political center of gravity in the U.S. has ever more markedly shifted to the right over the last two and a half decades since the election of Ronald Reagan, it has simultaneously become increasingly clear that the arguments in favor of an ever-stronger Europe advanced by the Nobel Prize-winning American economist Joseph Stiglitz have been prophetic. The former chief economist of the World Bank, Stiglitz became one of the most forceful critics of the Bank and of the International Monetary Fund, the twin global enforcers for multinational capitalism. Long before George Bush's war in Iraq, Stiglitz argued -- in a series of books and articles -- that only a European Union that was both economically and politically puissant and coherent could provide a counter-weight to the U.S.-led drive toward the economic globalization that gives the behemoth multinational corporations free and untrammeled reign over our destinies, and offer some hope of resistance to the U.S. military adventures from which those multinationals profit so handsomely.

The war in Iraq, of course -- opposition to which was led by France, Germany, and other nations of "Old Europe" (to borrow Rumsfeld's famous epithet), and which was intensely unpopular even in countries (like Italy and Spain) whose governments, at the time of the invasion, supported the war -- underscored the added importance of a strong Europe as a brake on U.S. imperial adventures. And Bush's aggressive proclamation of an American first-strike doctrine -- which insists on Washington's right to make war or take military action against whomever it likes whenever it likes -- ought to have convinced the sceptical that a strong Europe was necessary to have any hope of preserving the world's fragile peace, since the Bush first-strike doctrine appalled most Europeans, whether of the left or of the right.

Moreover, the parliamentary elections in Spain in the Spring of 2004 -- as I wrote at the time -- "dramatically shifted the balance of power within the European Union against the Atlanticist alliance that sundered the authority of the United Nations by invading Iraq." Last year's eviction of Spain's pro-war Aznar government, and the concomitant election of the anti-war, moderate Socialist government of José Luis Rodriguez  Zapatero, has presaged the probable outcome of next year's parliamentary elections in Italy. The regional elections in Italy two weeks ago were a crushing defeat for Bush's last important Continental ally on Iraq: Premier Silvio Berlusconi and his hard-right governing coalition (and which includes the cosmetically air-brushed neo-fascists led by Vice-Premier Gianfranco Fini) were dramatically slapped down by an electorate with whom the Iraq war and occupation are enormously unpopular -- upwards of 70% of Italians in the public opinion polls oppose Italy's support for the U.S. Iraq policy. As even the conservative editorial writers of The Economist acknowledged in their election analysis, the defeat of Bush's ally in those regional elections means that there is, at the very minimum, "a strong chance that Mr. Berlusconi's lot will lose" next year. And I'd say that's a considerable understatement (the latest Italian opinion polls this past week all show Silvio and his allies losing to the center-left alliance, and the government crisis and Berlusconi's attempt to form a new government are a flailing against an obvious, growing trend).

With Aznar gone and Silvio tottering, even Bush's partner-in-lies Tony Blair's popularity heading into the U.K.'s May 5 parliamentary elections has taken a major hit -- his arrogant mendacity on Iraq about WMD and the "imminent" threat posed by the odious Saddam Hussein seriously undermined his credibility (and his center-right domestic policies have further alienated his base). Blair's New Labor is now down to just 33%--that's only a slim, six-point lead over the Tories in the latest poll released yesterday, with the anti-war Liberal Democrats siphoning off many Labour voters for a healthy 21%. And a poll for The Independent on Sunday this past weekend showed that, if Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown were leading Labour instead of Blair, Labour's vote would increase by ten points. Blair's support for the Iraq war has already atrophied his influence over the Continental European powers. And even Poland -- part of Bush's Eastern European "coalition of the bought" -- announced two days ago that it is going to withdraw its troops from Iraq. Significantly more so than at the time of the Iraq invasion, a strong Europe would be antagonistic to the American imperium.

But, contrary to the claims of its supporters, the new European Constitution is not a step toward a stronger Europe, but will actually lessen European influence on the world stage. And that's but one of the reasons why American progressives should be hoping French voters reject it next month. Let me explain why:

Although the new Constitution gives Europe a reinforced, lengthened presidency and its first European foreign minister, far from strengthening the voice of Europe in the World this Constitution would weaken it. Why? Because the requirements for adopting a common foreign policy are so restrictive. As the former Socialist Defense Minister of France, Jean-Pierre Chevenement (who resigned in protest over France's support for the first Gulf War) has repeatedly pointed out during the current campaign, under the Constitution the crucial role France played at the United Nations in opposing the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq would no longer be possible. Not only would a country like France no longer have the possibility of expressing its own view of the situation, but the Constitution restricts the ability of any member of the U.N. Security Council (like France) which is also a member of the E.U., to take a position contrary to that adopted by the European Commission. And the complicated weighting system for adopting policy within the Commission makes it possible for a handful of countries to veto any expression on foreign policy. You will recall that, in the leadup to the invasion of Iraq, George Bush was able to buy the support of a majority of European countries (by bribing the Eastern Europeans) for the war. Under the Constitution, the U.S. would, in effect, be able to buy a veto bloc of countries to avoid an independent role for Europe that is critical of Washington. Moreover, the Constitution specifically makes the E.U. subordinate to the authority and policies of NATO for foreign, defense, military, and security policy. This double hobbling makes a strong European voice in the world impossible--unless it supports the views and adventures of Washington, capital of the world's only "hyper-power" (to borrow the coinage of former French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine.)

The Constitution was prepared by an unelected convention of 115 members, all appointed by their national governments, which overwhelmingly had conservative regimes at the time the convention was named. And the Constitution was written under the direction of the convention's president, the conservative former French head of state Valery Giscard-d'Estaing (chased from the Elysee Palace by the voters after only one term, in 1981, and replaced by the Socialist Francois Mitterand amid a hail of Giscard corruption scandals). Given the political composition of those who wrote it, therefore, it is hardly surprising that the Constitution reflects the conservative, anti-regulatory, untrammeled-free-market ideology of its authors.

This document is a Constitution unlike any other in the world. It is of telephone-book length, with 448 different articles, making it difficult (if not impossible) for any ordinary citizen to unravel and understand. It also, in a manner unprecedented by any Constitution hitherto seen, establishes a whole range of policy questions as law -- rather than simply establishing a democratic political mechanism for the adoption of policy. By far the largest part of the Constitution is taken up by its Chapter 3--which enshrines in concrete a wide range of policy decisions on social and economic matters, all of a highly conservative bent, that would normally be decided upon by elected national legislatures after political discussion. To sum up, Chapter 3 institutionalizes what is being called "social leveling from the bottom." This Constitution removes from the sphere of democratic political decision-making a host of policy matters in a way that would set them in irrevocable concrete.

The hasty admission of the Eastern European countries that enlarged the E.U. to its current 25 members grafted on to Western Europe a gaggle of populous countries bereft of either the democratic traditions, the social safety nets, or the strong trade union movements of the Western European countries that initated the construction of a united Europe. This gives the E.U. a schizophrenic character, and under the Constitution the less democratically developed countries, with feeble social protections for their ordinary citizens, would be able to drag down to their level the E.U. member countries with advanced welfare states and historic traditions of democratic participation in politics and policy. Far from expanding the rights of workers and the salaried, and their protections against poverty and economic disaster, the Constitution gives primacy to market forces as the sole guarantor of economic health. It institutionalizes conservative economic ideology in a host of policy areas. To take just one example: electricity. The Constitution would end the state-owned monopoly of electric power that exists in all Western (and many Eastern) European countries, and substitute a market-driven energy sector --  that would inevitably lead to dramatic price increases for electricity, already quite expensive in Europe by comparison to the U.S. The old notion of a "public utility" is thrown out the window. Similar policy declarations on a wide range of economic questions are also included in the infamous Chapter 3--for example, there can be no restriction on the movement of capital within the E.U., meaning the great monopolies, trusts and banks could shift money around within Europe to escape those countries (like most in Western Europe) which have laws governing unfair exploitative or usurious economic and fiscal policies, allowing those capitals to be placed in countries where feeble tax laws are more honored in the breach than in the observance. Chapter 3 would be a shot of adrenalin for the process known as "delocalization"--by which corporations move their factories and assembly plants from the countries of Western Europe with strong trade union movements, relatively high wage levels and strong social safety nets, to Eastern European countries that have none of these, where labor is cheaper and more exploited. The one thing that is strengthened in the Constitution is the role of the Central European Bank -- a sort of European I.M.F., whose arch-conservative governors would have little check on their exercise of fiscal power. All of this is why, in the opinion polls, a majority of the French are saying they believe the Constitution would lead to a decline in their personal economic situations.

This Constitution also institutionalizes an undemocratic Europe, in which all power resides in its president and in the European Commission which chooses the president. Their decisions will have the effect of law -- while the elected deputies of the European parliament at Strasbourg would be, in effect, castrated, for Strasbourg is given almost no more power than it currently has (and, by virtue of the policy decisions that would be enshrined in the Constitution, shorn of its little real power in many domains). A Europe that is institutionally undemocratic is a prescription for hatred of the E.U. by Europeans, whose dislike of the E.U.'s bureaucrats in Brussels is already considerable. And that sows the seeds for conflicts that would further cripple European unity and render the E.U. role on the world stage even more meaningless. In the case of any conflict between national laws and policies and the conservative policies built into the Constitution, it is the E.U. court system and its unelected judges who would decide between them. With neither its president, nor its principle power-wielding body (the Commission) elected by popular vote, it is not an exaggeration to call this Constitution anti-democratic.

Finally--to underscore its anti-democratic character-- it would be virtually impossible for the Constitution to be amended, once adopted. Even if there were to be a change in the political composition of member governments to the left, and even if the "Rose Europe" of the '90s -- with a significant majority of its countries governed by the left or left-center coalitions -- were to return, the conservative Constitution would be unalterable. Why? Because any single E.U. country can veto any Constitutional amendment. Thus, one would only have to purchase the support of a tiny, corrupt country -- like, say, Albania -- to prevent any attempt to introduce progressive changes in the Constitution's conservative economic policies and end its embodiment of conservative ideology--or to strengthen Europe's ability to speak clearly on foreign policy in opposition to Washington. This is the multinationals' dream Constitution -- and one with which Bush & Co., and the neo-imperialist neo-cons, would be delighted.

A weaker Europe, vassalized to the U.S. through NATO, in which social and economic protections for its citizens against the ravages of the unregulated market are weakened, crippled or dismantled, and which contains no truly democratic mechanism for either adopting policy, making political decisions with the force of law, or making changes in the Constitution -- that sums up the reasons why progressive Americans should hope that the French vote "Non" on May 29. If they do, the Dutch -- who hold their own referendum a week later -- will, observers predict, likely vote No as well. That would effectively kill this Constitution and require a new constitutional convention -- which, given the changes in the politics of European countries now under way, might well be significantly less conservative. Another good reason to hope that the Giscard Constitution is soundly defeated--as indeed now seems likely.

P.S. Friday, April 22: A new poll out today for the newsweekly L'Express shows continuing gains for the "non" vote, which now has a 16 point lead over the "oui," 58% to 42%....Also today, a new poll for LCI radio and Le Figaro shows that a solid majority of the Socialists' electorate -- 57% -- opposes the party's position in favor of the "oui." At the same time, however, the Socialists' electoral base does not believe that a victory for the "non" should be a reason for any change in the party's directorate: 74% of pro-Socialist voters say the Socialist Party's leader, Francois Hollande, should not resign if the "non" wins. Which means that the hopes of the party's left wing (about 25% of the party, whose principal leader is Socialist deputy Henri Emmanuelli) that a grassroots revolt -- against Hollande and the so-called "elephants" who run the party -- could be provoked by a probable "non" victory in the referendum, is only wishful thinking.